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Preface 
This working paper was p~epared for a volume of essays on the proposal for 
nationa'l economic planning being edited by Laurence Chickering. An earlier ver-
sion was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Economics and Allied Social 
Science Associations In Dallas, Texas, on December 29, 1975 .. 
THE CONTRAST BETWEEN GOVERNMENT PLANNING AND BUSINESS PLANNING: 
MARKET ORIENTATION VERSUS CENTRALIZED CONTROL 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum, Director 
Center for the Study of American Business 
'-lashington University, St. U>uis 
The widespread use of planning techniques· in private business has led 
many· observers to draw parallels to government planning. Senator J~cGb K. Ja~ts, 
the co-sponsor of the proposed Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act of 
1975 (the Humphrey-Javits National Planning Bill) has stated, in support of 
his bill, "if corporations are to take a look at where their companies are 
1/ 
heading, it seems appropriate for the government to do the same."-
In the same article, Senator Javits refers to a school of thought which 
finds planning "perfectly acceptable" for corporations but unacceptable for 
government. Those of us who actually have been involved in planning for both 
the public and the private sectors may also be aware of the important differences 
as well as the similarities between public and private planning. As a former 
planner in the aerospace industry, voluntarily retired, I cannot help but note 
that for a number of years the industry-looked up to Lockheed for the most struc-
tured, sophisticated, and widely emulated long range planning in the defense 
industry. Is bu$iness planning more a case of the closer you get, the worse it 
looks? 
Clearly some examination of the development and workings of the planning 
process in the private sector should be of some use in the current debate over 
the desirability of setting up a formal long-range planning mechanism for the 
Federal Government. 
Development of Long Range Business Planning 
Long range planning in American business is primarily a post-World War II 
?} 
phenomenon. It has undergone two distinct phases, although ma~y corporations 
Note: The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Linda Rockwood 
to the research for this paper. 
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still have not made the full transition to the second phase. The first phase 
was essentially an extension of long-range budgeting and sales forecasting. 
Past and present performance was simplY extrapolated into the future on the 
b~sis of rather rudimentary techniques. The implicit but under~ing assump-
tion was essentially passive -- that business would primari~ respond to current 
market forces rather than attempt ~ influence future developments. 
The second phase is more activist in outlook. It seeks to identi~ the 
major issues and options which will face the corporation in the future and to 
~ indicate possible new courses of action. It is often predicated on the belief 
that the pace of technological and environmental change is more rapid now than 
it was in the past and that the new trend will continue into the foreseeable 
future. 
With the widespread establishment of corporate planning staffs in most of 
the large corporations and in many .medium size companies, a business planning 
fraternity has developed. A variety of professional associations and journals 
has been established. The Budget Executives Institute was renamed the Planning 
Executives Institute. And, inevitably, business planners frequently meet to 
exchange experiences, if not to provide mutual moral support. 
\>lith the rapid growth of planning staffs, planning doctnnents, and planning 
personnel, what has been the impact on the companies themselves? How successful 
have the planning efforts turned out in practice? Frank~, there are few objective 
measurements of this essentially subjective activity. We do have the evaluations 
provided by observers of the process. 
David Ewing reports in his classic study of long-range business planning, 
"The paradox is that the planning movement, despite such strong motives to make 
it su~ceed, has not generallY been blessed with success. The tritnnps have been 
-3-
stunning -- but few. ,!!J 
Planning consultant Malcolm '11. Pennington rates 99 percent of all 
corporate plans as failures because planning (a) has changed the way companies 
operate in only a very few cases and (b) has rarely satisfied the needs and 
desires of top management. "Certainly no other function has survived so much 
futile work, or such frequency of failure."2f 
Patrick H. Irwin reports that, to his knowledge, fewer than one company 
in twenty has .succeeded in instituting a well-developed system of long-range 
strategic and operational planning.§( 
E. Kirby 1-l?rren, in a major study of business planning, concluded that few 
executives were satisfied with their company's ability to translate long-range 
planning int? meaningful practice. It is intriguing to consider Warren's 
observation that each company management took solace in the fact that, while 
their company was not doing a very good job in this area, neither was any of 
its competitors. "Frankly, this was quite accurate in 1958, and, unfortunately, 
there are relatively few exceptions today." according to Harren.7/ 
In his summary of the state-of-th~-art of business planning, Robert J. 
Mockler presents the following evaluation: "In spite of the advances made 
during the 1960's, relatively few companies have developed effective planning 
operations although many have tried. ,/2/ 
These essentially negative. evaluations tend to be in accord with the 
detailed survey a decade ago of planning in the government-oriented defense 
industry in vrhich the author participated: 
" ••• inquiries were made into the role that formal planning plays 
in the corporate strategy decisions that determine the future posture 
of the firm. The responses suggest the limited role that planning does 
play in corporate decision-making. Corporate executives tend to rely 
more on their intuitive judgment as to the significance of current trends 
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and future activities ••• The executives frequently stated 
that their decisions are not made from within a detailed 
planned structure. As one officer put it, they must rely 
on 'taking advantage of opportunities rather than having 
a deep plot' to achieve successful results in their business." 
Even an enthusiastic exponent of business planning such as George 
Steiner acknowledges the shortcomings that occur: 
"In the development of profitable and healthy organizations 
there is no substitute for long-range planning. For many it 
has afforded the margin needed to achieve outstanding growth 
and profitability. Too few companies, hQ~~ver, actually 
achieve effective long-range planning."]£/ 
Some of the reasons for the shortcomings in the practice of business 
planning may be limited to the private sector. Others may be more uniYers~l, 
and their correction in the public sector even more difficult. Mockler, for 
example, points out that the business planner 
''works in a vacuum, acting as a sounding board for corporate 
management's futuristic thinking but iso~it~d from the 
operating realities of the organization. ~ 
Consider how much more serious the consequence would be of the govern-
ment planner working in a vacuum isolated from reality. He nevertheless would 
be involved in what could be critical decisions affecting the future of indi-
vidual private sector organizations and individuals. 
Irwin lists as one of the four reasons for the lack of success of business 
planning, the failure to provide a system that integrates the goals of the 
company with those of individual managers. 12/ The problems of _integrating the 
goals of 200 million citizens, including tens of thousands of private sector 
managers and decision-makers, are surely staggering. 
Despite the various shortcomings, many American buaness firms do continue 
to engage in formal long range planning efforts and apparently believe that the 
benefits exceed the costs. A variety of reasons is given, not all of which may 
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be applicable to or desirable in the public sector. Many company managements 
state that planning is a powerful instrument for tightening organizational 
discipline and control of the business. Others contend that planning can be 
used to lend authenticity and plausibility to the corporate leader. In this 
latter view, a chief executive officer of a corporation with a formal pl~, 
neatly printed and indexed and properly illustrated, preferably with detailed 
statistical appendices, provides the image of having the management task well 
in hand. His counterpart who still relies on intuition and the proverbial 
back of the envelope may be at a psychological disadvantage. 
According to David Ewing, one of the most important and recurring motives 
w · . for planning has been the desire for controlling what people do. In the 
words of the manager of planning of Stauffer Chemical, "The only time the 
planning department is doing a useful purpose is when it is doing something 
that the chief executive wants done •••• The planner is at his most powerful 
when he has the unequivocal support of a strong chief executive."~ 
Many individual business planners and planning organizations survive 
and prosper because of the importance of the ancillary functions they may 
perform. These range from diversification studies and merger negotiations to 
economic forecasting and market research to providing a corporate focal point 
for social responsibility concerns and governmental relations. Moreover, the 
chief planner may essentially serve as an internal management advisor. He or she 
may be a useful individual to be included in corporate management groups, 
particularly where the other participants are committed to representing speci-
fie company divisions or large functional areas. 
Business Versus Government Planning 
Even if the shortcomings of the state-of-the-art of business planning are 
not as universal as indicated above and can be reduced or eliminated with 
additional time and effort, there are important differences between business 
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and government planning. These differences should influence our views toward 
the desirability of adopting a stronger and more influential national planning 
system. Boiled down to fundamentals, we are dealing with the difference between 
forecasting and reacting to the future and trying to regulate it. Corporate 
p·lanning of necessity is based on the principle of trade -- attempting to per-
suade the rest of society that they ought to purchase the goods and services 
produced by a given fi~; the controls that may accompany the plan are inter-
nally oriented. In strikin~ contrast, the government is sovereign and its 
planning ultimately involves coercion, the use of its sovereign powers to 
achieve the results that it desires. Its controls are thus externally oriented, 
extending their.sway over the entire society. 
At the outset, the proponents of a formal national economic planning 
system say that they would not set specific goals for General Motors, General 
Electric, General Foods, or any other individual firm. But what would they do 
if these companies would not conduct themselves in the aggregate in accordance 
with the national plan? Would they leave the actual results to chance or to 
the free market? Hardly. They state that the planning office 'vould try to 
induce the relevant industries to act accordingly. nl5/ 
And the inducements of course are not trivial. The totality of the 
government's powers to tax, to purchase, to subsidize, to "assist" and to 
regulate are awesome. The most powerful and sophistic.ated planning system in 
the private sector lacks the ability to levy taxes and to funnel the revenues 
from those taxes· away from one potential sector of the society and to another. 
Although much of the rhetoric favoring a national economic planning 
system is in terms of merely developing and providing better information, im-
proved fact gathe~ing appears to be a means to another end. Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan referred, in a somewhat different connection, to that increment to 
central control that seems to accompany enlarged information gathering. l§/ 
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Even a cursory examination of the literature on American business 
planning demonstrates that planning is intended to be far more than improved 
information accumulation and analysis. Malcolm Sherwood offers one of the 
more comprehensive statements in this regard, based on work of the American 
Management Association: 
"Planning is an analytical. process which encompasses an assess-
ment of the future, the determination of desired objectives 
in the context of that future, the development of alternative 
courses of action to achieve such objectives, and the selection 
of a course or courses of action from among these alternatives."!1./ 
Robert G. Murdick offers a variation on that theme, "A plan is a pre-
determined course of action over a specified period of time which represents 
a projected response to an anticipated environment in order to accomplish a 
specific set of adaptive objectives."'JlY Ewing offers what is perhaps the 
most terse rendition, "Planning is to a large extent the job of making things 
happen that would_ not otherwise occur."l9/ 
The proponents of centralized government planning do not leave the matter 
in any doubt. They clearly state, "The heart of planning is to go from infonna-
tion to action."20/ They go on to point out, "In order to be effective and 
useful, an Office of National Economic Planning must be set up at the cepter of 
our most influential institutions ••• The Director of the Office of National 
Economic Planning should be designated as the chief adviser to the President for 
economic affairs."?Ji 
The essence of the difference between public and private planning is the 
locus of decision-making. If Ford or General Motors or Chrysler are not selling 
as many automobiles as they had planned, there are a limited number of things 
they can do about the matter. They can -- within their available resources --
lovrer the price or change the nature of the product. But -- as evidenced by the 
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demise of the Etlsel, the LaSalle, and the DeSoto -- they may at times simp~ 
be forced to abandon the project. The consumer remains the ultimate decision-
maker. 
The situation is quite different in the public sector. Compared to the 
largest private corporation, there are more options available to the govern-
ment. If the government does not think that the American public is buying 
enough cars it can lower the price to the consumer as much as it likes via 
tax reductions, down to z~ro if it so determines. Alternatively, the gove~ment 
can subsidize the private manufacture of automobiles or it may purchase outright 
the output of the automobile industry or simp~ take over the ownership and 
control of the industry. The government certainly has demonstrated the willing-
ness to involve itself in the production of motor vehicles to the extent of 
deciding by fiat many aspects of their design and operation, under its safety 
and environmental powers. 
Senator Hubert Humphrey has made the same point much more vivid~: 
"vlhat can government do about it? Government can do a lot 
about it. For example, the size of automobiles, and con-
sequently energy consumption, can be influenced a great deal 
by taxing cubic displacement, horsepower, or weight. A tax 
will slow down purchasers of large cars and give a premium 
to small-car buyers and buyers of cars with high fuel effi-
ciency. Government can also influence industry by giving an 
investment tax credit to companies that produce fuel-efficient 
automobiles. These are just two ways in wh~ch government 
policy can influence the private economy." 
The Senator also reminds us that the government is a large purchaser of 
goods and services: 
"Everybody else fades into insignificance in comparison. From 
the viewpoint of purchasing power, General Motor~_~s a peanut 
stand compared to the United States Government."~ 
Mr. T. A. Murphy, Chairman of the Board of General Motors, has provided 
a clear distinction between business and national planning: 
"If all we were talking about were government plans that are 
comparable to business plans, there would indeed be nothing 
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to debate. Government units, of course, should try to anti-
cipate future demands on their resources and plan to meet 
them, just like any private business. We wish them well at 
it and would like to see them do an even better job. But 
that isn't the issue. 
"Unlike a business, a government may not only plan -- it 
may also command. A business can set goals only for itself~?/ 
a government body can set goals for other people as well."~ 
The point being made here is not that private planning does not involve 
control, but that those subject to its control powers are quite different. 
Once a private corporation adopts its long-range plan, it may push hard on 
the various units of the corporation to meet their goals and objectives. But 
the controls are essentially internal -- incentives and sanctions focusing 
exclusively on the officers and employees of the corporation; if things go 
wrong, the onus falls on the officers, employees, and shareholders. Government 
planning, in contrast, focuses on "guiding" or "influencing" -- and thus 
ultimately controlling -- the activities of the entire nation. If things go 
wrong in public sector planning, it will be the taxpayer and consumer who 
bear the main burden. Note the close connection between selecting planning 
objectives and the programs to carry them out in the statement of the proponents 
of centralized planning: "It goes without saying that the final choice among 
all feasible alternative planning objectives and programs belongs to Congress •••• 
Consider carefully the comment of Senator Hubert Humphrey, the co-sponsor 
of the Balanced ·Growth and Economic Planning Act of 1975, "I don't think we 
ought to compel, but we surely can influence."'?2/ As Hebert Stein has noted, if 
the government can make a private citizen an offer he cannot refuse, it can 
. i 26' exerc1se coerc on.~ 
In a sense, there may be two types of government planning that need to be 
distinguished. The external planning -- which has been discussed. here involves 
all sorts of extensions of government powers over the private sectors of the 
rrg}Jj 
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economy. A second type of government planning is more internally-oriented, 
and may be more comparable to private sector planning. This second type of 
planning really relates to the management of government's own activities. 
The advocates of more powerful government planning tend to merge the two, 
using shortcomings in government's management of its affairs as a reason for 
extending government power and influence over consumers and business. 
In his far-ranging statement advocating national economic planning, Senator 
Humphrey deals in passing with this second aspect of government planning: 
" ••• we don't have any economic impact statement for govern-
mental decisions. The government goes around willy-nilly 
making decisions of consequence. There was no estimate of 
the economic impact of the Occupational Safety Act, for 
example. I happen to be for the occupational safety pro-
gram, but what were its economic implications? Did anyone 
think that through? No. 
" ••• the manner in which we are presently utilizing govern-
ment resources and government agencies is a haphazard, 
helter-skelter enterprise ••• we can show that with some 
planning in our government, just a modest amount, a little 
more than we're doing, we can reduce g~y~rnmental costs 
and get better governmental services. rtg:u 
It would appear, however, that a gov~rnment which is being conducted on such 
a haphazard, helter-skelter basis would be rel~ctant to take on the extremely 
ambitious task of managing the entire economy prior to getting its own house 
in order. Moreover, attempts in the recent past to apply business planning 
techniques to the management of the government's own affairs do not inspire 
confidence. Certain~, they do not form a satisfactory basis for an expansion 
of government planning efforts along the lines of the Humphrey-Javits bill. 
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System and Other Planning Experiments 
There is little need to guess at the impact of a government-wide planning 
system at the Federal level. We need only examine the planning system that was 
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instituted by President Lyndon B. Johnson. On August 25, 1965, he announced 
with great fanfare the introduction of "a very new and very revolutionary 
system of planning and programming and budgeting throughout the vast federal 
government, so that through the tools of modern management the full promise 
of a finer life can be brought to every American at the lowest possible cost."g§,/ 
President Johnson went on to describe his view of what was given ~acronym 
PPBS in some detail: 
"Under this new system each Cabinet and agency head will 
set up a very special staff of experts who, using the 
most modern methods of program analysis, will define the 
goals of their department for the coming year. And once 
these goals are established this system will permit us to 
find the most effective and the least costly alternative 
to achieving American goals •••• So this new system will 
identify our national goals with precision ••••• "?:2./ 
PPBS initial~y was greeted with great enthusiasm. For a while it created 
a land-office business for the services of economists, statisticians, and program 
analysts. Professors Bertr~ Gross and Michael Spring enthusiastically described 
PPBS as "potentially the most significant management improvement in the history 
of American government ••• "~ The August 1965 annotmcement did have a substan-
tial history behind it. Since January 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert s. 
McNamara and Assistant Secretary Charles J. Hitch had been attempting to apply 
the principles of program budgeting to Pentagon decision-making. And a substan-
tial portion of the McNamara-Ritch reforms have endured in the Pentagon, notably 
the 5-year projections of force structures and budgets, as well as the review of 
budget submissions along program rather than merely service lines. 
Some of the enthusiastic overreactions in the implementation of PPBS perhaps 
were inevitable and not fundamentally different from private sector experiences. 
When one divisional manager of a large electronics company was asked to state his 
division's basic goals as an input to the corporate planning process, he listed 
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4oo different "basic goals." Another division manager's plan consisted entire-
ly of 100 pages of statistics, with not a single word except for column headings. 
Also, it takes many years, not the mere months in President Johnson's timetable, 
to establish a planning system. As pointed out by Harold Henry, formal planning 
systems do not materialize in "a period of a few weeks." Such a system is 
d rr u31
1 6o eveloped gradually over a period years. ~ R. Hal Mason estimated a -108 
month time sequence for the establishment of a full-fledged planning organiza-
t . 32/ 1.on.-
In retrospect, it is quite clear that PPBS -- at either the Pentagon or 
White House levels -- did not help the Federal Government avoid fundamental 
overcommitm.ents either at home or abroad or to avoid an unusual array of "crises." 
Those who blithely assume that the "successes" of business planning can readily 
be replicated at the national level may well ponder over both the failure of the 
Edsel in the private sector and the nature of the major federal decisions which 
were made at the peak of the PPBS enthusiasm -- a deeper American involvement 
in the Vietnam War and the overpromising of the Great Society domestic programs. 
The point being made here is not that the attempt to introduce organized 
planning led to these failures but rather that it clearly did not prevent them. 
David Ewing offers a stronger conclusion, "For sheer magnitude of fiasco, however, 
business cannot compete with planners in the military and government."33/ 
Since 1969, the PBBS apparatus has largely been dismantled in the Federal 
Government. What remains is performed in a more modest manner and as part of 
the annual budget preparation. One of the more sympathetic but balanced appraisals 
of the PPBS effort was prepared by Jack W. Carlson, a professional economist 
who was involved in the program in a major way at the Office of Management and 
Budget: 
"The U. s. experience was clearly short of the ideal. 
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Initially, PPBS became a different, somewhat competitive 
channel for decision-making ••. the intent was to provide 
more useful information for the development both of budgets 
and legislation, but that was not the initial result • 
••• The government, not to mention the private sector, already 
turns out thousands of analyses, eva~uations, and studies ~41 
every year. Their influence on policy is usually negligible."b 
In_view of the impact of a more formidable planning system, such as that 
utilized in Great Britatn, perhaps we should be pleased that the results of 
PPBS were mainly paper shuffling; wheel-spinning exercises. In his analysis 
of Britain's experiences with centralized planning, John Jewkes painted a 
rather dismal picture: 
"I believe that the recent melancholy decline of Great 
Britain is l~rgely of our own making ••• At the root of 
our trcUlbles lies the fallacy that the best way of 
ordering economic affairs is to place the responsibil~~~ 
for all crucial decisions in the hands of the State."Th 
In his analysis of the French planning experience, John Sheahan cites 
a different type of problem, the possibility of large private corporationscoming 
to dominate the government planning process. This would be an extension of the 
widely held "capture" theory of federal regulatory agencies, whereby the indus-
tries being regulated may come to dominate the decisions of the government 
agencies set up to ·regulate them. Sheahan contends that planning by consultation 
and negotiation in France tends to drive the government planners into such close 
alliance with business interests that the planning board becomes a champion of 
the firms which it finds it easiest to deal with. Since these are usually the 
la.rgest businesses, government pl,anning thus has weakened competition and may 
have resulted in neglecting social concerns.1§! 
Uhder none of these alternatives does a comprehensive scheme of national 
economic planning appear to improve the overall performance of the national 
economy.If anything, it would tend to shift even further the focus of private 
enterprise away from dealing with market forces and meeting consumer demands 
• 
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and toward reaching an accomodation with an ever more powerful governmental 
bureaucracy. A company might find it desirable to shift resources from 
conventional marketing activities toward convincing the government to adopt 
more generous production targets for its industry. Thus, the payoff from 
traditional consumer market research might be less than from new efforts to 
persuade the government to treat the i~dustry more generously. 
We could readily conjur up visions of civilian companies following some 
of the practices of that branch of American industry, defense production, 
which is now most closely tied to governmental decision-making. Business-
financed hunting lodges and fishing trips for civilian government planners 
might seem to merely follow an older defense industry tradition. But, 
legal or not, such public sector "marketing" activities would seem to be a 
low priority usage of business resources. Yet, given the incentive of any 
organization to grow and prosper in the environment it faces, this result 
would not be surprising under a system of strong national economic planning 
and decision-making. 
Conclusion 
The advocates of national economic planning who base their case on an 
extension of business planning activities overestimate the state-of-the-art 
in the private sector. In a study of thirteen large, technically oriented 
manufacturing companies, the author and his colleagues reported that most of 
the output of long range planning groups was found to be more in the nature of 
scheduling current programs with long leadtimes, rather than in the develop-
37 I 
ment of tne long-range business plans.~ 
The study concluded that typical long-range plans contained excessive 
amounts of trivia, such as monthly delivery schedules, the recruiting budget, 
square footage of storage space by type, and so forth. "This may - in a small 
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way - help to explain why business plans are so infrequently used as 
real decision-making tools."3B/ 
The rapid turnover of planning staffs and business planners is striking 
testimony to the basic dissatisfaction with the results. On the basis of many 
years of attending meetings with business planners, the author developed the 
following rule of thumb: anytime you hear a business planner explain how 
planning is done in his or her company, remember that the odds are better than 
one out of two that in two years that planning staff will no longer exist, 
that person will no longer head the planning operation, or both. 
It is apparent that no amount of formalized planning has eliminated any 
company's uncertainty concerning future technological change, the vagaries 
of weather, discoveries of energy or other natural resources, outbreaks of 
war, assassinations of national leaders, or even shifts in the desires of the 
fickle consumer. As Gerald Sirkin has stated, "Planners have no crystal ball" 
or as James Matheson, Director of the Decision Analysis Group of the Stanford 
Research Institute put the matter, "In this age you can't plan on your plans. "Y2/ 
Yet, of course, business planning continues, and for a variety of reasons, 
including the sheer momentum of past activity as well as the useful by-products 
of the information provided to the management. There is an important "opportu-
nity cost" involved that should be recognized. The manpower and other resources 
that are devoted to the planning effort are unavailable for other purposes. 
Both the high cost and the often modest results have led many companies 
to scale back the originally overly ambitious planning efforts on which they 
had embarked. In good measure this may have been the natural pattern of reaction 
and accomodation to the overselling of a new management activity, but one 
avowedly with more durability than the short-term fad. Yet, at least in the 
• 
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case of one major corporation (General Motors), apparentlY the word planning 
no longer is used in any corporate title or to describe any corporate activity. ~ 
As pointed out earlier, the possibilities for building on business planning 
experiences to mold a national planning system are not attractive. Even discount-
ing the very serious shortcomings of existing business planning techniques, the 
differences between business and government decision-making are fundamental. 
Despite all of the sophisticated apparatus, business planning is based on 
the traditionally implicit -- and increasingly explicit -- assumption that the 
ultimate decisions on the allocation of resources in the society are to be made 
by individual consQmers. An important corollary of that is if a company guesses 
wrong on what consumers buy it will suffer the consequences. 
Government planning, implicitly or explicitly, is based on a fundamentally 
different set of assumptionso Government determines what it considers to be in 
the society's overall interests. If the public does not respond accordingly, it 
is not the planners who are considered to be at fault. Rather, new and more 
effective devices must be developed to get the public to accomodate to the 
planners' view of the good (or great) society. 
Boiled down to its essence, business planning is part of a decentralized 
decision-making process where the individual consumer makes the ultimate choices. 
National planning is a centralized process in which the key economic decisions 
are made in the form of governmental edicts. The greatest danger of adopting 
a form of centralized economic planning is that it will, perhaps unintentionally 
at first but inevitably as its initial results prove disappointing, propel the 
society away from market freedoms and toward greater governmental controls over 
individual behavior. 
•' 
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